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SOME CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF WAR
RENT REGULATION MEASURES.
The mobilization of a great peaceful population into an efficient fighting force requires the marshalling and direction of
every resource of that population, human or material. The production, transportation and distribution of commodities must be
controlled and everything directed to the one end of winning the
war. Self preservation is the first law of nations as well as of
nature. Reorganizing our industrial life to fit such a program
during the late world war, we found ourselves confronted with
many difficult problems, not the least of which was the "housing" problem.
A hasty survey of the situation will indicate that the housing
emergency was not confined to any particular place, or to any
particular period of the war. It was widespread in its sweep,
universal in its accompanying hardship and everywhere fraught
with the same grave social and economic evils. It was but
another evidence of the serious social and economic disorganization that attends the successful pursuance of a modern war.'
Other countries faced the necessity and pushed through
varying types of laws to remedy the emergency conditions. 2 In
England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, British South Africa, India, France, Belgium, Spain,
Germany, Holland, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
Austria, Hungary and Czeeho-Slovakia, housing difficulties arising out of-war conditions directly or indirectly led to regulation
of rentals in some form to improve the whole housing situation.
In our own country the federal government and many of the
states took action along these lines. Many cities, large and small,
were also compelled by the housing emergency to adopt measures
regulating the relationship existing between landlord and tenWalter F. Dodd and Carl Zeiss, Rent Regulation and the Housing
Problem, American Bar Association Journal, January, 1921, pp. 5-12;
Edward L. Schaub, Regulation of Rentals 4during the War Period,
Journal of Political Economy, Volume 28, January, 1920, pp. 1-35.
2 A general review of foreign housing activity and legislation will
be found in the brief of the Attorney General of the State of New

York in Guttag v. .ohatzkin, 194 Appellate Division 509 (N. Y.); 230
N. Y. Reports 647; N. Y. Law Journal December 27, 1920.
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ant.3 These measures were not always a direct regulation of the
relationship but they certainly had an effect upon it. Legislation was enacted stimulating building by tax exemptions, or by
direct subsidies affected rentals in so far as they succeeded in
increasing the supply of available houses.
Where high rentals prevailed whether in large metropolitan
center or in small industrial town, suddenly expanded by war
time contracts, the social and economic consequences that followed were much the same. An adequate housing supply is a
basic essential for a wholesome, healthy people. Speaker after
speaker before the Senate Committee on Reconstruction and
Production sounded a note of 'alarm as to the effects of the housing shortage on the general moral tone of the country. Representatives of business groups concerned more with profits than
social welfare were apprehensive of the effects of the housing
shortage on the American standard of life. These fears were not
without basis.
A competent health authority commenting on the New York
situation said, "As a result of the abnormal overcrowding thousands of families are forced into unsanitary and dangerous
quarters. Health authorities are powerless because it is impossible to vacate such premises under present conditions. This
usual legal remedy is useless to cope with the present conditions.
It cannot be used because there are no other better places to
I
which such families can remove.
Overcrowding means close contact, and has resulted in a
marked increase in the infant death rate. The relation of bad
housing to child death is startling. Infant mortality is 50 per
cent higher in districts where there is the greatest overcrowd4
ing."1
8For a general survey of this subject see the hearings in 1918 on
the bills to prevent profiteering in the District of Columbia; before the
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia of the Senate on H. R.
9248; before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on the Bill H. R. 12443; before the Committee on Public
Buildings and Grounds of the House of Representatives on the bill
H. R. 12818 (also H. R. 12835). The British Increase of Rent and
Mortgage Rent (War restrictions) Act of 1915, to restrict increases
of rent during the War is also of interest. For a good statement of
the arguments against rent regulation see Te Week7y Review, August
25, 1920.
'Hearing before the Select Committee on Reconstruction and
Production, United States Senate, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, Pursuant
to Senate Resolution 350, Washbngton, Government Printing Office,
1921.
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In Washington, D. C., the government was forced to concentrate in a very small area an army of civil employees altogether
out of proportion to the District's permanent population. This
great influx of population placed the whole body of civil
employees at the mercy of those controlling the available housing
facilities. The high rents demanded of the war-workers resulted
in conditions of over-crowding. Over-crowding caused conditions dangerous to health. During the influenza epidemic it
became particularly dangerous.
Although the housing shortage was most certainly a result
of the dislocation of the existing social and economic order that
came from the world war, it did not appear with mathematical
simultaneousness at the invasion of Belgium, neither did it end
with the signing of the Armistice. In many places the stage was
set for an acute housing shortage before the war, if one did not
already exist. The war simply aggravated the situation or
brought the matter to a head. The shortage continued long after
the actual fighting was over. In fact housing conditions in many
places were much more acute in that difficult period of readjustment which followed the demobilization of the armies than during the war period proper. If we had housing shortages in the
earlier days of the war because of the necessity of building
"Satellite cities" around munition works or shipyards, we had
the same conditions in 1920 from different causes. Throwing
the war machinery out of gear meant directing millions of men
back into peaceful pursuits; tearing down the tremendous industrial system set up to win the war; taking large numbers out of
strictly war industries and directing them into normal business
activities. During this period of unscrambling conditions were
worse than before the Armistice.
The means used to correct the problem were quite similar in
the main both in this country and abroad. There were two different devices used. The first .method used was an attempt to
regulate rental rates directly by setting up some system of determinig what was a reasonable rate and what was not.
The
second method used was an attempt to regulate rental rates
indirectly by correcting the monopoly condition which enabled
the landlord to charge exorbitant rates. This latter method
usually took the form of a subsidy to aid building by some gov-
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ernmental agency. The lfousing supply being increased, the law
of supply and demand took care of the rental rate.
The legislation which attempted to regulate the rates of
rentals directly took two main forms in this country. The first
type is represented by the District of Columbia law passed by
Congress in connection with certain amendments of the Food
Control Law (Lever Act) ;5 the second type is represented by the
series of acts passed by the New York Legislature in the spring
of 1920.
The Legislation of the first type as a general thing was predicated on the establishment of a commission. This commission
was the regulating agency, empowered by the law to determine
and fix jijst and reasonable charges for the use of rented property.
Legislation of the second type operated directly through the
courts. For example, the New York law made the fact that rent
was unjust and unreasonable a defense to an action for its
recovery, and also laid down the rule that an increase of more
than 25 per cent over the rent existing in a year before should be
presumed unreasonable and oppressive. By another act of the
same series, the landlord in order to avail himself of summary
preceedings for possession was required to prove that the rent
demanded was no greater than the amount paid the month preceding the default, or had not been increased more than 25 per
cent over the rent existing a year prior to the suit.
The New York legislation is different from the federal
legislation in fixing by way of presumption, a definite percentage
of permissible increases for the individual case and in making the
determination of a reasonable rent incidental to the exercise of
the court's judicial function in respect of the recovery of debt
and the restitution of possession. Both types of legislation rest
upon the same common principle-the existence of a public
interest in the landlord and tenant relationship arising out of
the distressing conditions prevailing in congested centers.
Legislation granting subsidies to relieve the housing shortage was passed by the federal government and by several of our
state and local governments. In taking this step they were following the course adopted in many European countries.
I See the Wisconsin plan, Laws of Wisconsin, 1920, ch. 16, pp. 14-19,
Spec. Sess.
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The rent measures attempted by Congress did not have to
wait long for judicial interpretation. The Saulsbury Resolution
passed on May 31, 1918, by Congress was declared unconstitutional shortly afterwards in the cases of Willison v. McDonne16 and Groot v. Riley, as a taking of property without just
compensation. The case of Willison v. McDonnel testing the
constitutionality of the Saulsbury Resolution was submitted to
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia on October 13,
1919, decided on December 1, 1919, and on motion for re-argument on Docember 24, 1919.
The Saulsbury Resolution did not attempt to regulate rents.
What it did was to declare openly that the existing possession of
a tenant, except in certain unusual cases might continue at his
option, notwithstanding the expiration of the tenancy. Payment
of the rent fixed by the expired lease was the consideration for
the occupancy so continued. It was not the payment of a fair
and reasonable rent. The Resolution provided that though the
occupancy might continue indefinitely it was beyond the power of
the landlord to increase the rent or to appeal to any tribunal for
relief.
No provision was contained in the Resolution regulating
rents on a basis of reasonableness, nor for a continuance of possession based upon fair and reasonable compensation. One
result of the Resolution was to cut down the reversionary
interest of the landlord at the will of the tenant by postponing
until the conclusion of the treaty of peace his right to re-enter
and repossess his land. For this transfer of an admitted and
valuable right of property, the Resolution provided no consideration. There was no presumption either of law or fact that
rent fixed under altogether different conditions and circumstances for a term already past, would be fair and reasonable
for an indefinite future occupancy owing its existence entirely
to the Resolution itself. Viewed in this light, the effect of the
Resolution'was to deprive the owner of this property without
compensation.
Judge Robb in passing on its. constitutionality pointed out
that the' purpose of Congress in passing the Resolution was to
prevent owners of real estate in the District of Columbia from
(1919)

266 Federal 1008.
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collecting excessive rents during the war. This was to be
accomplished by closing the doors of the courts to owners who
should attempt to get possession of their property, occupied or
to be occupied under oral or written agreements, including those
already expired, so long as the tenant or occupant 'continued to
pay rent at the rate he had been paying before.
The effect of tis, the court showed, was that the owners
of property unoccupied at the date of the Resolution or completed after that date were much more advantageously situated
than were the owners of property occupied at that time, since it
was permissible for owners of the former class to demand whatever rent the tenant would agree to pay. Accordingly, one who
became a tenant after the passage of the Resolution, might and
probably would pay substantially more than a tenant in possession of like property under similar conditions. It was quite
probable also that the new rate would nore nearly approximate
the fair rental since the increased cost of living normally would
affect the cost of maintenance and upkeep of property and
hence the rental rates.
The Resolution did not prescribe rates, uniform or otherwise. In other words varying rates under varying conditions
and circumstances were arbitrarily continued in force. Consequently the court said, it not only deprived the citizen of property without compensation, but its operation was not uniform,
for it affected and was intended to affect in one way property
already under lease. One class of owners was arbitrarily
required to accept a rental based in many instances upon prewar conditions, and which, therefore might be so inadequate
under war conditions as to amount to taking of private property
without compensation, while another class was left free to exact
whatever rent they might obtain. The Resolution likewise prevented the sale for business purposes of one class of property
and permitted the sale of another. For these reasons the court
held it invalid.
The failure of the Saulsbury Resolution was the signal for
renewed activity on the part of Congress. The result was the
Ball Rent Law of October 22, 1919.7 This act provided for a
commission vested with the power to regulate rents and the matter of service in connection with the letting of dwelling premises,
141
ment.

Statutes at Large, Federal Statutes Annotated, 1919 Supple-
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business property and hotels. By its provisions the tenant
could not be evicted so long as he paid the rent fixed by the commission unless the owner himself or a bona fide purchaser from
the owner wanted to occupy the premises.
This Act was held unconstitutional in Hirsk v. Block by the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in a two to one
decision, the Chief Justice dissenting.8 In this case the District
Court held that there was no analogy between the power to fix
rental rates between private individuals and the power of the
legislature to fix rates for service where the owner has devoted
the business affected to a public use.
In this way the court distinguished between the case before
it and the Grain Elevator Case, 9 the Railroad Rate Cases, the
Insurance Cases, 10 the Bank-Guarantee Case," the Irrigation
14
Cases, 1 2 the Wharf Case, 13 and the Pipe Line Case.
On March 3, 1921, the case was argued before the Supreme
Court of the United States. On April 18, 1921, that body in
a five to four decision held the Ball Rent Law constitutional.
Associate Justice Holmes spoke for the majority in this case.
He was supported by Associate Justices Brandeis, Pitney, Day
and Clarke, Associate Justice McKenna rendered the dissenting opinion. He was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice
Edward White and Associate Justice Van Devanter and
MceReynolds.
The Ball Act proposed to secure for the landlord a reasonable rent. The court agreed that the interpretation of the word
"reasonable" would probably deprive the landlord in part at
least of the power of profiting by the sudden influx of people
to Washington, and accordingly of a right usually attached to
fortunately situated property. However, restrictions placed
upon these properties derived from an economic situation arising out of a national misfortune were looked upon by the court
11267 Federal 614, 48 Washington Law Reporter, 37S.
9 (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
11(1914) German Alliance Insurance Company v. Lewis, 233 U.
S. 389.
2 (1910) Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104.
(1905) Clarke v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361. (1906) Strickley v. Mining
Company, 200 U. S. 527.
"(1909)
Wyeems Steamboat Company v. People's Steamboat Company, 214 U. S. 345.
14 (1920)
Producer's Transportation Company v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228.
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as quite justifiable in view of the fact that similar restrictions
accomplished through taxation measures have been accepted.
The restrictions here the court felt were quite similar to the one
put upon the rights of the owner of money by the usury laws.
Because of this state of affairs the Court deemed the Ball Rent
Law constitutional and valid.
In the final analysis this case aside from its temporary
feature illustrates a more extended application of the doctrine
of Munn v. Illinois'5 which was enlarged in the case of the German Alliance Company. It may be said to represent the views
concerning the police power expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in
his dissent in the Lochner case' 6 and in his majority opinion in
17
the Noble State Bank v. Haskell case.
In Chastleton Corporation et at. v. Sinclair et at., Rent
Commission of the Districtof Columbia, et al. we have the sequal
to Block v. Hirsh. In this case the plaintiffs alleged that the
emergency which originally justified the law no longer existed
and that they were deprived of their property without due process of law. Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for the court held
this contention presumptively true and that for convenience the
facts should be gathered and weighed by the court of first
instance and the evidence preserved for the Supreme Court if
necessary. He held thht while the legislative declaration that
a justifying emergency exists as a present fact is entitled to
every good respect, so far as this declaration looked to the future
it could be no more than a prophecy and was liable to be controlled by events. He also pointed out that a law depending
upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of
facts to uphold it might cease to operate if the emergency ceased
or the facts changed even though valid when passed.' 8
(1876) 94 U. S. 113.
10(1905) 198 U. S. 45-Judge Holmes in this case made his frequently quoted statement that "The Fourteenth Amendment does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." "A constitution," he says
in the case, "is not intended to embody a particular economic theory
whether of fraternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the
State or of laissezfaire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural
and familiar, or novel and even shocking, ought not to conclude our'
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict
with the Constitution of the United States.
(1911) 219 U. S. 104.
' 3 The court cites Perrin v. United States 232 U. S. 478, 486, 487.
Missouri v. Chicago, Butrlington and Quincy Railroad Company, 241
15
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As to whether the exigency existed upon which the continued operation of the law depended, the court found that it
was a matter of common knowledge that living conditions in
Washington, . C. had improved considerably. 19 The court did
not attempt to decide *foritself on the basis of off hand judicial
knowledge the existence or non-existence of the facts upon which
the validity of the legislative act must depend. In spite of a
prima facie indication that justifying facts did not exist and
that the statute was void, the court sent the case back to the
lower courts for future interrogation.
STATE LEGISLATION.

State Legislatures in relying upon the police force to regulate rents went to the doctrine established in the case of Munn
v. Illinois 20 that where property is so held that the facts give
to its owner a practical monoply and where the service rendered
by the property-owner is a service necessary to industry, the
property is impressed with a public interest, and its use becomes
subject to legislative regulation by virtue of the police power
of the state.
The Munn case was decided in 1876. The doctrine of property with a public interest was definitely formulated in that case.
The court stated the principle that "when one devoted his property to a use in whick the public has an interest, he in effect
grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to
be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of
the interest he has thus created."
U. S. 533, 539, 541. The court also refers to the case of Newton v. Consoliaated Gas Company, 258 U. S. 165 in which a statutory rate that
had been held valid for earlier years in WMileox v. Consolidated.Gas
Company, 212 U. S. 19, was held confiscatory for 1918 and 1919.
"0It is a matter of public knowledge," the court said, "that the
Government has considerably diminished its demand for employees
that was one of the great causes of the sudden afflux of people to Washington and that other causes have lost at least much of their power.
It is conceivable that as is shown in an affidavit attached to the bill,
extensive activity in building has added to the case of finding an abode.
If about all that remains of war conditions is the increased cost of
living, that it is not in itself a justification of the act. Without going
beyond the limits of Judicial knowledge, we can say at least that the
plaintiff's allegations cannot be declared off hand to be unmaintainable,
and that it Is not impossible that a full development of the facts will
show them to be true. In that case the operation of the statute would
be at an end."
(1876) 94 U. S. 113.
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The business affected in the Munn case was the storage of
grain in elevators in the city of Chicago; the public control
exercised consisted in the regulation of the charge. Two justices
dissented in this holding on the ground that such regulation
not being for the protection of health, safety, or morals could
only be imposed upon businesses exercising a public use, as distinguished from those exercising a use in which. the public has an
interest,that is, that a business could only be so regulated which
a state might carry on, or which was invested with powers
reserved to the state such as eminent domain. Despite this contention a number of cases were decided about this time sustaining similar control exercised over railroads. These cases were
called the Granger cases and mark the beginning of a rapidly
expanding doctrine of state regulation.
In Brass v. North Dakota 21 the court took a step in advance
of the Munn case. The Granger cases might be construed as
making the power to regulate charges dependent upon the
monopolistic characterof the business; the same -view might be
taken of the decision in Budd v. New York 22 in which the court
likewise emphasized the virtual monopoly enjoyed by the business; the same point was emphasized in Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler 23 where the court recognized that the state
may regulate the supply of water if the supply is monopolized.
But in the Brass case the requirements of a monopoly, legal or
actual, as a justification for the legislative regulation of charges,
was abandoned. The expression in the earlier cases concerning
the monopolistic character of the business were now declared to
have gone only to the question of the property, not the power
of such legislation. Four judges dissented vigorously from -this
opinion with the objection that only a practical monopoly justifies the regulation of charges.
Although the strong dissent left the question somewhat in
doubt for a time, this doubt was dispelled by the holding in the
case of German Alliance Insurance Company v. Kansas 24 in
which the doctrine of the Brass case was expressly approved
and applied to the insurance business. In this decision and
similar ones the courts have taken a very liberal view of what
=
=
-

(1914) 233 U. S. 389.
(1891) 143 U. S. 517.
(1883) 110 U. S. 347.
(1914) 233 U. S. 381.
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makes a business public in character and the police power has
been interpreted broadly.
The power of regulation which had long been applied to
innkeeper, wharfingers and common carriers, was extended in
turn to grain elevators, 25 to stockyards, 26 to the ginning of cotton 27 to the collection' and distribution of news, 28 to employment
agencies, 29 to insurance, 30 and to banking. 31
In these cases the courts have had to lay down certain
fundamentals concerning regulation. As remarked by Mr.
Justice McKenna, "These cases demonstrate that a business, by
circumstances and its nature, may arise from 4 private to be
of public concern, and be subject to consequence of governmental regulation. And they demonstrate, to apply the language
of Judge Andrews in the Budd case that the attempts made to
place the right of public regulation in the cases in which it has
been exerted, and of which .wehave given examples, upon the
ground of special privilege conferred by the public or those
affected, cannot be supported." The underlying principle is
that business of certain kinds holds such a peculiar relation to
the public interest that there is super-induced upon it the right
2
of public regulation.3
In these cases the courts have shown that there are no fixed
classes of property fixed with a public interest. The courts have
also shown that the considerations that justify regulatory legis33
lation are too numerous to be set down in any given formula.
They have also shown that verbal definition being out of the
question, the scope of legislative authority in this respect must
be worked out by the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion.34
2Munn v. Illinois, (1876) 94 U. S. 113, 133.
atoliff v. Wichita Union Stoc yards Company, (Kansas) 86
Pacific 150, 6. L. R. A. (N. S.) 839.
Oklahoma Gin Company v. State, 158 Pacific 629.
2Inter-Ocean Publishing Company v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 483,
56 N. E. 822.
"Brazee v. Michigan, (1916) 241 U. S. 340.
"German Alliance Insurance Company v. Kansas, (1914) 233 U.
S. 389, 411.
2Noble Etate Bank v. Haskell, (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 112.
"Statement by Mr. Justice McKenna in GermanAlliance Insurance
'Company v. Lewis at p. 406.
" See Hudson County Water Company v. McCarter, 207 U. S. 349.
'See Davidson v. Neuw Orleans, 96 U. S. 104; Bud, v. New York,
143 U. S. 517, 534; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S.104, 112.
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With these facts before them the courts of this country were
brought face to face -with the question as to whether the housing
and rental situation in the cities of the country disclosed those
distinguishing features, those essential elements-present in
other cases of public interest.
Those who were opposed to rent regulation vigorously contended that those distinguishing characteristics found in other
cases of public interest were not present here. They went back of
the Brass case and the German Alliance Insurance Company case
and contended that the renting of real property presented no
real element of special privilege such as would imply an obligation to the public. They recurred to the contention set forth in
the Granger Cases and in the Budd Case that the power of regulation vesting in the legislature is dependent upon the monopolistic character of the-business. They argued that the landlord's
right to rent his property existed not as a special privilege but as
an incident of the right of use and disposition inherent in ownership.
Connecting up the power of regulation with the grant of a
monopoly, or franchise, or some special statutory privilege they
refused to accept the validity of rent regulation. The fact that
these matters did not enter into the consideration of the courts
in later cases affecting regulation 5 and that it has been contended that they never had a real basis in the old Common Law 8
failed to impress the opponents of rent regulation.
They also contend that there was not a general public
demand of sufficient strength to meet the requirements of the
definition of "public interest" set up in the other cases. Proponents of rent regulation replied that there is never a universal
public demand for anything. No matter how extensive in face
the demand may be for any particular service or commodity, they
pointed out, it is always limited to some definite fraction of the
community. They observed that insurance was affected with a
"public interest" but only a relatively few individuals availed
themselves of it.
-"Peoplev. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 27, 22 N. E. 670; Ratciff v. Wichita

Union Stockyards, supra; Webster TeZephone Case, 17 Neb. 126, 22 N.

W. 237.
Edwird A. Adler, "Business Jurisprudence" 28 Harvard Law

Review, 133; and "Labor, Capital and Business at Commown Law." 29
Harvard Law Review, 241.
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The courts in determining whether or not the housing and
rental situation existing in the various cities of the country
'showed the fundamental requirements of a "public interest" as
set forth in other cases had to dispose of these contentions and
determine from the previous decisions of the court the circumstances which give rise to a "public interest." These circumstances are widely different and. perpetually changing. Though
they are not easily fitted to a formula, they may nevertheless be
said to have in all cases a common result-that is a condition of
virtual monopozi, or to put it differently, an absence of effective
competition in some field.
This condition m'ay arise out of a franchise or a statutory
privilege, but not necessarily. Neither are these circumstances
the principal sources of monopoly. Where there is no franchise,
or statutory grant, the absence of competition may be the result
of an abnormal condition on the side of supply, or of abnormal
conditions on the side of demand.
Control of the supply may be the determining factor. Negation of free competition may come from the natural monopoly,
that is from limitations which are natural in the physical sense,
as in the case of water and gas, or it may result from limitations
which are natural only because of existing circumstances. The
grain elevators enjoying an exclusive proximity to transportation
facilities in Chicago are in point. Where the locations available
for a particular purpose are necessarily few and cannot be
enlarged, or multiplied, competition does not affectively regulate
their use. In such cases while there is no fixed physical limitation as in the case of natural monopolies and the creation of new
facilities is always theoretically possible, a virtual monoply
exists, and it becomes necessary to regulate the prices charged
by those who control this virtual monopoly.
On the other hand, control of the supply may be relatively
unimportant and the determining factor in suppressing the condition of free competition may come from the nature and scope
of the demand. At times there are demands, powerful pressing
demands for some human necessity which though not artificially
or naturally limited, cannot be supplied adequately by normal
economic processes. Here again a virtual monopoly exists, if the
need, is fundamental and pressing and there is no economic sub-
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stitute. The public interest in such cases is given additional
impetus in all periods of extraordinary economic stress.
'Where a virtual.monopoly exists, unless the public interest is
recognized and protected, the whole body of the people, or
important parts of that body will stand in a position of economic
helplessness before those controlling the monopoly. The recognition of this condition of economic dependence is at the root of
practically all of our social and industrial legislation. Regulation of price is the only effective corrective of such a condition.
The exercise of the legislative power is justified by these conditions of social fact arising from emergency conditions, or these
other monopoly conditions. Whether or not the stress of the
situation has reached the proportions required to make regulation necessary is a question of social judgment which only the
legislature is competent to make.
The housing situation in the cities of this co-dntry presented
the following conditions. There was a shortage of houses
amounting to a fixed limitation of the supply. There was a
demand intensified by the cessation of building activities and the
rapid concentration of population in cities. This demand was
an emergency demand, not stable enough, or permanent enough
to bring private enterprise into play with an increased construction, if that were possible. There was no competition between
landlords controlling the available supply of habitable property.
In short, free competition had broken down as far as the business
of supplying homes was concerned. It was as non-existent as in
the business of water or gas, or other services, generally considered proper objects of public regulation. A fixed limitation
of the supply and a sudden, highly intensified demand being present-a condition of virtual monopoly resulted. The law-making
bodies of several important states, as well as Congress, recognized
this fact by the enactment of regulatory legislation.
The New York Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
the United States confronted with these facts applied the principles of the Brass Jase. and the German Alliance Insurance Case
to rented property in justifying legislation which restricted landlords to the receipts of a reasonable rental.3 7
"People Excel. Durham Realty Company v. La Fetra, (1921) 230
N. Y. 429; Marcus Brown HoJing Company v. Feldman, (1921) 41
Scop. Ct. Rep. 465.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion it may be said that the competency of the government to deal with extortion, oppression, and emergency has
never been disputed at any stage in the development of AngloAmerican law38 Indeed it is recognized that a very important
purpose of the government has been to prevent extortion and
oppression and safeguard the public. We have noted that the
law early recognized that there were many callings and businesses
to which the public necessarily had to resent, and in which they
had an interest. If undisturbed by law, extortion in many
cases would follow. We have noted that whenever the public is
subjected to such monopoly conditions, in law or in actual effect,
the power of oppression inherent in monopoly is restricted by
law. Whenever the peculiar economic and social condition
governing the case permitted, a free competitive condition to
exist, both in law and in fact, the government ceased to regulate
as the need disappeared and public opinion ceased to demand
such regulation.3 9
The conditions existing during and after the war would
certainly seem to justify some action by the government to relieve
the existing distress. The shortage of houses would seem to
bring the business of letting houses for hire within the principle
of Munn v. Illinois. Unquestionably, the home is a fundamental
necessary of social life. It would seem to be so, at least to the
same degree if not to a greater one, than the railroad train, the
warehouse, the telegraph, or the telephone. Every landlord
offering a house to rent, is in the business of housing or rendering
housing service. Just as the warehouseman in the Munn Case
offered to the public a storage place for grain, so the landlord
offers dwelling places to people. If the service of storing grain
"Ancient English Statute, ascribed to both 51 Henry III and to
"Be it enacted that no forestaller be suffered to dwell in any

13 Edward I.

town; a man who seeking his own evil gain, oppressing the poor and
deceiving the rich goes to meet corn, fish, herring, or other articles
for sale as they are being brought by land or water, carries them off,
and contrives that they shall be sold at a dear rafe-he that is convicted thereof, the first time shall be amerced and lose the things so
bought, and that according to the custom and ordinance of the town;
he that is convicted the second time shall have judgment of the pillory;
at the third time he shall be imprisoned and make fine; the fourth

time he shall adjure the town, etc."
"See Wyman, Public Service Corporation, Chapter I.
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is impressed with a public interest, it would seem that the service
of housing people should be given equal consideration. If the
service of housing is impressed with a public interest, the power
of the legislature to regulate follows. This is the position taken
by Dean Wigmore in his analysis of the rent regulation meas40
ures.
Henry H. Glassie of the Washington,.D. C. Bar and Special
Assistant to the Attorney General in the Block Case adopts much
the same idea in an article in the Virginia Law Review 4' His
proposition is that the business of offering homes for hire is
affected with a public interest and therefore subject to regulation.
Charles K. Burdick 42 in discussing the basis of the power to
regulate rents comes to the same conclusion.
War time conditions impressing the service of housing people
with a public interest during the existence of such conditions it
is difficult to see how the power to regulate may be rebutted. It
is the extraordinary condition in effect that makes regulation
necessary and valid. The point is repeatedly made by those urging the constitutionality of rent regulation measures that these
measures are purely emergency measures, and if it were not for
that fact their validity would be an altogether different matter.
That does not mean, as Justice McKenna asserts, that constitutional limitations are lifted because of the emergency, or that'
some form of the European "state or seige" is in fact recognized.
No such a thing. The constitution as stated in Ex parte Milligan
remains in force during war time emergency conditions just as in
times of peace. It's force and effect is not suspended. The thing
that is changed is the housing conditions which because of the
war time circumstances puts the renting public at a grave disadvantage, with serious hardships resulting to them, thereby
impressing the service of housing with a public interest and
bringing it within the limitations of the constitution.
Mr. Podell, of counsel for the tenants, says "both Mr.
Guthrie and tbhe writer who argued in support of these laws in
John H. Wigmore, A Constitutional Way to Reach the Homing
Profiteer, Illinois Law Review, Volume XV, January, 1921, pp. 359-368.
"Henry H. Glassie, The Regulation of Rents, Virginia Law Review, Volume 7, 1920, pp. 30-62.
onsttutiona My of the New York Rent
0Charles K. Burdick.

Laws, Cornell Law Quarterly, Volume 6, 1920-1921, pp. 310-317.
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the United States Supreme Courts, made it clear that were it
not for the pressing and prevailing emergency it would be difficult to sustain these laws as constitutional. 43 In the Castleton
Cae;44 in 1924 as noted, the plaintiffs alleged that the emergency which originally justified the law no longer existed. Justice Holmes held this contention presumptively true and
remanded the case back to the lower courts for appropriate
action.
It is suggested by some that the difference between an
emergency in fact and an emergency in fiction is but a meager
one. A continued prolongation of the emergency period as the
justification for exercising this power they looked upon as making the departure a permanent one. These observers pointed out
that if the emergency was in effect in 1918 it was likewise in
effect in 1924. There is to be sure, some basis for apprehension
when such a prolongation takes place.
Whatever course is followed in the future in outlining and
determining the respective rights of landlord and tenant, we
may safely presume that where the express will of the people
through their representatives is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, but has for its purpose the protection of the public, or a
large body of the public, the legislation resulting will have to be
very clearly in conflict with the constitution to effect its nulliflcation. 4 5 We may further safely presume that a very liberal
interpretation will be given to the application of the police power
and that the novelty of the form of this application will be no
46
effective defense to such application by those opposing the law.
New York Times, March 2, 1921.

41

"(1924)
S. 543.
"Samuel

Clastleton Corporation Et At v. St. Mlair Et At, 264 U.
Williston in discussing freedom of contract (Samuel

Williston, Freedom of Contract,Cornell Law Quarterly, Volume 6, 1920-

1921, at p. 379) comments on the gradual narrowing of the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment and similar constitutional limitations and
decides that, "It is no longer possible for those who would like to decide
such questions by a mere appeal to liberty and freedom of contract to
avert what Huxley called 'the tragedy of a fact killing a thought' by
putting a constitutional sanction behind a cherished dogma." Undoubtedly the burden rests on one who proposes a limitation to prove that it
is needed or desirable, but no more can be said."
"Mr. John B. Cheadle in an article on "Government Control of
Business," Columbia Law Review, volume 20, 1920, pp. 438-450, advances
the idea that the extent of the government's legislative power over

private business is not fixed or limited by the Federal Constitution

WAR RENT REGULATION

Dean Roscoe Pound in speaking of the state of the common
law today, said:
"There are many signs that our law is entering upon a new stage
of development. Already there is a call for juristic-creative activity
and for the same judicial resourcefulness and legislative inventive
capacity that marked the formative'period of our institutions."

After considering that fact with satisfaction, he added:
"If we do our duty by the common law of the Twentieth Century,
we must make it a living system of doing justice for the society of
today and tomorrow, as the formers of our policy made of the traditional materials of their generation an instrument of justice for that
time and for ours."

Public opinion cannot make unconstitutional legislation
valid. If a proposed measure contravenes our fundamental
law, the strength or pressure of public opinion can have no possible effect, save by changing such fundamental law. Ours is a
limited government. The makers of the Constitution would
have nothing of a government with unlimited power. To them,
government was an evil thing at the best, with carefully prescribed powers and duties, outlined in the organic law set up by
the sovereign people.
These men feared above all things the tyranny of the temporary majority or "multiplied tyranny" as Burke called it.
Neither would they permit individual liberty to depend on the
good disposition of the government. Accordingly they set up a
constitution containing fundamental immunities against governmental power, protecting all persons in certain spheres. The
minority was especially in need of such protection. To insure
necessary changes the amending process was set up. The amending process is the one and the only legal method of changing
our constitution. The courts can not by interpretation, so twist
or distort the language of the constitution so as to give it a new
47
meaning.
further than this-that such power may not be exercised for an arbitrary purpose, but must be for a reasonable one, and of course for one
that is public; also that the criteria for the definition of "arbitrary"
and "reasonable" and "public" are variable with changing and growing
needs of society and that the weight to be given each interest, the legislative branch of the government is to judge.
,TSee article by Forrest R. Black, Tie Vanishing Bill of Rights,
American Law Review, 1927, Volume 61, pp. 227-245.
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On the other hand, it becomes the duties of our courts in the
exercise of their office, to interpret our written constitutions, not
in a manner inconsistent with their language and purpose, but
at least in somewhat the same spirit as Dean Pound would have
our common law treated. If we are to put faith in Dean Pound
such a spirit becomes of more than passing importance in the
light of the awakening, which he reads into the law of our day.
As remarked by Judge Pound in People Ex Rel Durham Realty
Company v. La Fetra.48 "The law of each age is ultimately
what that age thinks should be the law." This would seem to
apply when attempting to determine the law regulating the relationships existing between landlord and tenant 40 in times when
the whole national life is disorganized by war.
F. R. AuANN.
43(1921) 230 N. Y. Rep. 429.

4"Note Mr. Black's statement concerning the several schools of
constitutional interpretation. To one of them he says "a written Con-

stitution containing 'parchment banners' is a futile thing." The evolv-

ing sense of right of the community is the only source and sanction
of law. All is flux and "with every breath of the American people there
Is born a new Constitution." "This group," Mir. Black says, "are so
completely under the spell of the idea that we are living in a dynamic
world that they deny the practicality of formulating any principles
whatsoever, for words uttered yesterday could not have the same meaning today." This position he believed to be a protest against the canonIzation of our Constitution which has so long dominated our political
and legal thought. The adherents of this "Static conception of the
Constitution" attribute to the founding fathers of the Constitution the
political wisdom of the ages. To them their achievements were a little
more than human and in their handicraft the Constitution something
that anticipated each and every situation that might possibly arise
in the future. Mr. Black suggests that between these two positions
there may be found a more substantial method of viewing the Constitution which will recognize both its utility and its limitations.

